Abstract. The theoretical equivalence between the DLP and DHP problems was shown by Maurer in 1994. His work was then reexamined by Muzereau et al. [11] for the special case of elliptic curves used in practical cryptographic applications. This paper improves on the latter and tries to get the tightest possible reduction in terms of computational equivalence, using Maurer's method.
Introduction
Maurer and Wolf [6, 8, 7, 10] proved that, for every cyclic group G with prime order p, the DLP and DHP over G are equivalent if there exists an elliptic curve, called auxiliary elliptic curve, over F p with smooth order.
Muzereau et al. [11] showed that such auxiliary elliptic curves are highly likely to exist for almost all elliptic curve groups. It is however remarked that it gets extremely hard to construct them as the order of G increases. Auxiliary elliptic curves with smooth orders were built and explicitly presented for most of the curves in the SECG standard, hence making Maurer's proof applicable to most of the groups used in practical elliptic curve cryptography.
The idea behind the method introduced by Maurer [6] rests on the concept of implicit representation: The implicit representation of an integer a (modulo p) is defined to be g a ∈ G. The algorithm proceeds by doing computations in the implicit representation instead of the usual explicit representation. For example, to compute a + b in implicit form, g a · g b is computed instead which costs one multiplication. For a − b, we compute g a · (g b ) −1 costing one inversion and one multiplication. To compute a · b in implicit form, one call to an DH-oracle, that computes g ab given g a and g b , is needed. For the implicit form of a −1 , one uses the fact that a p−1 = 1, so a p−2 = a −1 , which would cost O(lg p) calls to the DH-oracle. Hence, granted access to a DH-oracle for the group G, all algebraic algorithms can be converted to work in the implicit representation.
This paper builds on [11] by tightening the reduction and trying to extend the result to the remaining curves. Our goal is to show that, for the elliptic curve cryptosystems described in the various standards, the number of group operations and DH-oracle calls required to reduce the DLP to the DHP is reasonably "small." Say for example that this number is less than 2 r then, if we believe that the much more extensively studied DLP over the same group takes at least 2 operations to solve then an algorithm for solving the DHP, and thus breaking the DHP protocol, would require a minimum of 2 −r group operations. Our target is therefore to minimise the value of r, in order to get the tightest possible security reduction.
Affine coordinates were used in [11] which requires division and hence a DH-inversion oracle was needed. This was implemented at the cost of O(lg p) calls to a DH-oracle which is clearly an expensive choice as it leads to a large increase in the number of DH-oracle calls. We use projective coordinates instead to avoid this problem. As a further optimisation we use an optimised square root extraction algorithm.
One would also think that using addition chains may reduce the cost of exponentiation but it turns out that this saves very little and only adds complications. So it was decided to use traditional methods of exponentiation and concentrate on the more critical areas of the algorithm. Section 6 expands on this and justifies this decision.
A list of auxiliary elliptic curves giving almost the tightest possible reduction, using the Maurer method, is presented in Appendix C.
Notation and Definitions
Throughout the paper, we let G be a cyclic group with generator g and prime order p > 3. We begin by defining the problems DLP and DHP.
Definition 1 (DLP and DHP)
-Given h ∈ G, the problem of computing an integer α ∈ [0, |G|) such that g α = h is called the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) with respect to g. -Given two elements g a , g b ∈ G, we call the problem of computing g ab the Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP) with respect to g. (a, b are unknown)
We also need to formalise the notion of a DH and DL oracles.
Definition 2 (DL and DH oracles)
-A DH-oracle takes as input two elements g a , g b ∈ G and returns g ab . We write DH(g a , g b ) = g ab . -A DL-oracle takes as input an element h = g a ∈ G and returns a mod |G|. We write DL(h) = DL(g a ) = a.
Both oracles return answers in unit time. (By definition of Oracles)
The equivalence between the two problems was theoretically established by Maurer and Wolf in the nineties [6, 8, 7, 10] , but it relies on the existence of some auxiliary elliptic curves whose orders must be smooth. These auxiliary elliptic curves are not necessarily easy to build and it seems they are exceptionally hard to find in general. Hence, a more concrete treatment for the elliptic curve groups used in practice proved necessary and this was done in [11] . The paper discussed the computational equivalence between the DLP and DHP, and it also presented an explicit list auxiliary elliptic curves needed for the reduction.
Note that, since solving any instance of the DHP given access to a DL-oracle is trivial 1 , we only concentrate on the reverse implication for the equivalence to hold: If we suppose the DHP turns out to be easy, we wish to know if this implies that the DLP is easy as well.
The base 2 logarithm will be denoted by lg x (instead of log 2 ). We will also use M and I to denote multiplications and inversions in G, respectively, and DH for DH-oracle calls. Formulae of the form xDH + yI + zM mean: Cost is x DH-oracle calls, y inversions and z multiplications in G.
1 Given g a , g b ∈ G, we compute a = DL(g a ) and then compute g ab = (g b ) a .
The algorithm
Given h ∈ G, we want to find the unique α modulo p such that h = g α . We assume an elliptic curve E over F p is given by the Weierstrass equation y 2 = x 3 −3x+b, with smooth order given as a product of coprime integers
with q j < B of roughly the same size, where B is some smoothness bound. This choice of the defining equation of E saves 1DH while adding points on it. The point at infinity on E is denoted by O.
To solve a DLP in G, Maurer's approach is to use a DH-oracle and solve the problem in the implicit representation over E, which is supposed to have a smooth order. So, given h = g α ∈ G and the elliptic curve E, as above, we check whether g y 2 = g α 3 −3α+b can be solved for y. If so then we have found a point Q on E in its implicit form, otherwise we replace α by α + d for some random, small, integer d and do the checking again until we get a point Q on E.
Note that, at this stage, we know Q in its implicit representation only. The idea now is to solve Q = kP over E, where P is a generator of E. Upon finding the value of k, we then compute kP in the explicit representation and hence recover the value of α, from the explicit first coordinate of Q. Given that E has a smooth order, we simply use the naive Pohlig-Hellman method of first solving the problem in the subgroups of E of prime power order, and then recovering k using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). The reader is referred to Algorithm 1 for the detailed description of the algorithm.
The crucial point to note is that we have a wide choice of curves over
So, with a bit of luck, one hopes that one of these sizes is smooth enough and hence the corresponding auxiliary elliptic curve would make solving our DLP easy. We draw the reader's attention to the fact that this is the same reason that makes the ECM factoring method so successful.
In the description of Algorithm 1, note that for the comparison step (12) to test whether a point (X : Y : Z), in projective coordinates, is equal to a point (x, y), in affine coordinates, we simply check whether xZ 2 = X and yZ 3 = Y . In implicit representation this becomes
This use of projective coordinates gives our greatest improvement over [11] . We also make some savings by storing precomputed values and using them throughtout the algorithm. The next two subsections will describe the improvements made.
Algorithm 1 Solve a DLP in a group G given access to a DH-oracle for G. Input: A cyclic group G = g of prime order p, an elliptic curve E/F p : y 2 = x 3 − 3x + b, generated by P , |E| = s j=1 q j and h = g α ∈ G Output: α = DL(h)
Step 1. Compute a valid implicit x-coordinate related to the DL α 1: repeat 2:
Choose d randomly, and set g
Extract the square root of z in implicit representation, to obtain g y . Now, Q = (x, y) is a point on E known in the implicit representation only (g x , g y ).
Step 3.
Use the Pohlig-Hellman simplification 6: for j = 1, . . . , s do 7:
repeat Solve Qj = kjPj in the subgroup of E(Fp) of order qj 10:
kj ← i. 14: end for
Step 4. Construct α 15: Compute k (mod |E|) such that ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , s} : k ≡ kj (mod qj).
Use CRT 16: Compute kP = Q in affine coordinates. 17: Then x (mod p) is the abscissa of Q, and α = x − d.
Square root extraction
We describe the special cases in the explicit notation. This algorithm is used by Algorithm 1, in the implicit representation, to compute g y from g z = g y 2 = g x 3 −3x+b , see Algorithm 2.
Suppose a is known to be a quadratic residue modulo p and we want to compute x ∈ F p such that x 2 ≡ a (mod p). Then, besides the general Tonelli and Shanks algorithm used in [11] , we also treat two special cases:
Treating these special cases is worthwhile since half the primes are congruent to 3 modulo 4, and half of the remaining primes are congruent to 5 modulo 8. The only remaining primes are all congruent to 1 modulo 8. We gain no advantage by using similar methods for this case, so we simply use the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm for the remaining primes, see [3, p. 32] .
Algorithm 2 Implicit square roots in a group G using a DH-oracle for G. Input: A cyclic group G = g of odd prime order p, and g z = g y 2 ∈ G. Output: g y .
end if 10: else 11:
Write p − 1 = 2 e · w, w odd. Tonelli and Shanks algorithm for p ≡ 1 (mod 8)
12:
Set g s ← g, r ← e, g y ← g
end while 17: end if
Explicit and implicit point multiplication
As already remarked, we use the projective coordinate system in step 3 of Algorithm 1 instead of the affine coordinate system. The formulae for addition and doubling 2 in the implicit representation easily follow from their standard explicit counterparts, see Appendix B. The cost of each operation is given in the following For the affine coordinates, note that we only need the explicit case (In the j-loop). The costs are:
1I + 4M for doubling and 1I + 3M for addition.
Since we will need to compute kP for different values of k but a fixed P , pre-computing the values 2 1 P, 2 2 P, . . . , 2 lg k P will save us some computation. Then, using the right-to-left binary method, we expect only 1 2 lg k elliptic curve additions. We now summarise the costs of exponentiation.
Implicit exponentiation in Projective coordinates:
The cost of the precomputation is about
and then each exponentiation would cost about
Explicit exponentiation in Affine coordinates: The precomputation cost is
and then each exponentiation would cost
Complexity of the algorithm
The complexity analysis of Algorithm 1, presented in Appendix A, yields the following theorem Theorem 1. Let G be a cyclic finite group of prime order p. Assume an elliptic curve E over F p has been found, whose B-smooth order is
where q j are not necessarily prime but are coprime of roughly the same size. Then, solving a given instance of the DLP in G requires on average about
For comparison, we quote below the asymptotic costs obtained by [11] O log 3 p
While the number of multiplications has remained the same, the number of DH-oracle calls has now become quadratic in the size of the group G instead of cubic.
Note that, in order to get a lower bound on the cost of solving a DHP instance, we no longer require the auxiliary elliptic curves' orders to be smooth. This is because as long as we assume that the DLP is an exponentially hard problem then we do not mind if the reduction from the DHP to the DLP is exponential too. This remark will allow us to choose s = 3 later, and then the task will be to find smooth elliptic curves whose orders are product of three coprime numbers. This is a significant relaxation of the smoothness condition.
Implications on the security of the DHP
The implications of this reduction on the security of the DLP was treated in [11] . We only comment on its implications on the security of the DHP, as it is here where the work done in this paper matters most.
Let C DLP , C DHP denote the costs of solving the DLP and DHP on an elliptic curve of size p, respectively. By Maurer's reduction, we have C DLP = N DH · C DHP + N M , where N DH , N M are respectively the number of calls to the DH-oracle and number of multiplications in G. Hence, for N M C DLP we get
Since solving the DLP on an elliptic curve E is believed to take at least |E| steps [2] , in general, then setting
we see that T DH gives us a lower bound on the number of operations required to break the DHP, assuming N M C DLP . Hence, it is the value of T DH that gives the exact security result, given the best auxiliary elliptic curves we found.
The tightness of the security reduction is controlled by two values. The first being the number of field multiplications N M , and second and most important is the value T DH for the reason put forth earlier. Tables 1 and 2 give the logarithms of these key values, lg N M and lg N DH , for the curves in the SECG standard [16] . They also give lg |E|, the logarithm of the (believed) minimum cost of solving an instance of the DLP. The column headed adv gives the number of security bits gained on the previous results from [11] . The last rows of the tables are detached to indicate that the values are theoretical and that no auxiliary elliptic curves could be generated for them, mainly due to the sheer size of the numbers that needed to be factored. As an illustration of the advantage gained over the previous results presented in [11] , we consider the security of DHP for secp256r1: The DLP on this curve requires about 2 128 computational steps, employing the currently known methods. Using our auxiliary elliptic curve, we deduce that the DHP cannot be solved in less than 2 115.3 computational steps, as opposed to 2 108 from the previous paper. That is a gain factor of about 2 7.3 over the previously reported value in [11] , see Table 1 .
Since an amount of computation of about 2 115.3 ≈ 5 · 10 34 group operations is infeasible with today's computational power, one can draw the conclusion that a secure implementation of a protocol whose security depends on the intractability of the DHP on the curve secp256r1 can safely be used, provided the DLP is really of the conjectured complexity.
Note that the SECG standard [16] includes all the curves in the NIST [12] and the most used ones in the ANSI [1] standards, covering the most commonly used elliptic curves in practice.
Building the auxiliary elliptic curves
By the argument presented in the previous section, we need to construct elliptic curves whose order is a product of three coprime numbers of roughly the same size. That is q i ≈ p 1/3 . Muzereau et el. [11] used the Complex Multiplication (CM) technique to build auxiliary elliptic curves with smooth orders but this does not perform very well as p gets larger, due to the prohibitive precision then needed for the calculations. In our case, it proved to be computationally more efficient to generate random elliptic curves and then test if their sizes are of the required form.
Let us estimate the probability that a number in a large interval centred around p is a product of three co-primes of roughly the same size.
Given three randomly chosen (positive) integers, we first want to compute the probability that they are pairwise coprime. Let p be prime. The probability that p divides two of these integers but not the third is 3/p 2 · (1 − 1/p) and the probability that p divides all of them at once is 1/p 3 . So, the probability that p is not a common divisor of any two of these integers is
Hence, the probability that three randomly chosen integers are pairwise coprime is
The infinite product is clearly convergent but a closed form of its value could not be obtained by the author. The numerical approximation 0.2867474 was obtained using PARI, [13] .
For a large interval (m, n), the product should be taken only for p ≤ m−n. Now, since 1−3/p 2 +2/p 3 is positive, strictly increasing approaching 1 from below, we deduce that the above estimate is a lower bound to the actual probability we want.
In practice, for large p and corresponding Hasse intervals, the above value proved to be a good estimate and it matched nicely with a Monte Carlo simulation to estimate this probability over large Hasse intervals.
For most cryptographic groups G from the SECG standard, auxiliary elliptic curve E of the form y 2 = x 3 −3x+b were successfully generated by finding a suitable value of b. Appendix C specifies these values together with the (prime) size of the group G, which is the characteristic of the prime finite-field over which E is defined. The size of the elliptic curve group |E| is given as a product of three coprime numbers of roughly equal size.
When trying to generate the auxiliary elliptic curves, the main difficulty was to actually factor |E|. For large |G|, factorisation fails most of the time and another random value of b is tried without any success. This is the main reason for failing to produce the necessary data for the three curves secp521r1, sect571r1 and sect571k1. However, two missing auxiliary elliptic curves from [11] , viz. secp224k1 and sect409r1 were successfully found. While first appears to have been just forgotten, the second was due to the difficulty of generating the auxiliary elliptic curves using the CM method.
Can we do better using Maurer's approach
Here, it is argued that not much improvement can be made using Maurer's reduction, as described in Algorithm 1.
Just computing g x 3 and (twice) checking the quadratic residuosity of g x 3 −3x+b will cost at least (2 + 2 × lg(p/2))DH.
For s = 3 we find that the ratio of the estimated cost of this paper to this bound is
Step 2 is not independent from the first so its cost can be reduced even further, but the third step does not seem to have any corelation with the previous steps. If we say that step 3 costs at least one exponentiation, to compute one of the (|E|/q j )Q, then the ratio drops to Hence, it turns out that about 3 bits of security is all that can be hoped for above the current work.
Conclusion
Assuming the DLP is an exponentially hard problem, we have shown that the Maurer-Wolf reduction with naive search yields a concrete security assurance for the elliptic curves recommended by the current standards, for which we could generate the auxiliary elliptic curves.
We have found two new auxiliary elliptic curves, missing from [11] , viz. secp224k1 and sect409r1. It remains open to find auxiliary elliptic curves for the curves secp521r1, sect571r1 and sect571k1. These will have sizes larger than 500 bits, which presents the current factoring algorithms with a big challenge.
Hence, the expected numberν of iterations for step 1 is
Thus the total average cost of this first step is lg pM + [2DH + 1I + (4 + Step 2: Following Algorithm 2, we treat three cases:
1. If p ≡ 3 (mod 4) then, using the precomputations from the previous step, we can compute g z (p+1)/4 in an average of 
will cost an extra 1DH + ( 3. Otherwise, we use the general (implicit) Tonelli and Shanks algorithm. We first write p − 1 = 2 e · w, where w is odd. The initialisation step requires roughly (
Finding the exponent and reducing it requires (r+2)DH per iteration, and at most e iterations are expected. Since r ≤ e, we will need e·(r+2) ≤ e·(e+2) calls to the DH-oracle. Hence, the total number of the DH-oracle calls is about 1 2 lg w − 1 2 + 2 + (e + 2)e DH.
Since p is odd, we can easily see that the expected value of e is
Bearing this in mind, we get w = p/2 e = p/4 and the total cost is then estimated to be 1 2 lg p + 17 2 DH.
Note: When concluding, we will use the weighted average of the costs above, which is
Step 3: Before entering the j-loop, we first pre-compute 2 i Q for i = 1, . . . , lg |E| 1−1/s . This is enough since q j are of roughly the same size, so q j ≈ |E| 1/s and then (2), the cost of precomputation is found to be about
We also pre-compute 2 i P for i = 1, . . . , lg |E| in affine coordinates 3 . According to equation (4), this costs about (1I + 4M) lg |E|. Now, let j be fixed (We want to analyse the cost of one j-loop). The cost for computing
where we have set γ j = lg(|E|/q j ). For the evaluation of P j = |E| q j P , in affine coordinates, equation (5) gives
For the i-loop, we note that g w 2 j and g w 3 j need to be computed only once for each j-loop, which costs 2DH. Now fix i. Computing iR = (i − 1)R + R, in affine coordinates, can be achieved with one elliptic curve addition costing 1I + 3M, since (i − 1)R has been computed and 1R = R is trivial.
The cost of comparison is about 2 × 3 2 lg pM = 3 lg pM. On average there will be q j /2 i-loops for each j-loop, and therefore the average cost of the i-loop is
Hence, the cost per one j-loop is
Noting that
we find that the total cost for step 3, without the precomputation costs, is on average
Adding the precomputation costs, we finally get the total cost of step 3
Step 4: We use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to reconstruct k mod
mod q j . This requires sI+2sM operations. Note that inversions are computed in F q 1 , . . . , F qs .
For computing kP , in affine coordinates, we use the previously precomputed values of 2 i P . So this exponentiation would cost only (1I + 3M) 1 2 lg k. Taking k mod |E| to be |E| 2 on average, we find the average cost of step 4 to be
Conclusion : We conclude that the total cost for Algorithm 1 is
Neglecting small terms and making the approximation 4 |E| ≈ p and b ≈ p/2, the average cost of Algorithm 1 is then found to be
Note that if we take q j to be of roughly the same size and fix B to be of this size then
and then
In practice, the cost of an inversion is at most 10M, see [2, p. 37] . Using this fact we have now established Theorem 1, stated on page 8. 
B Explicit and implicit point multiplication
We use projective coordinates in step 3 of Algorithm 1. Below, we give the formulae for implicit point multiplications on elliptic curves defined over a field of prime characteristic greater than 3. The formulae for the explicit case and their costs can be found in [2] . Explicit doubling costs 8M, and the formula for implicit doubling is
The cost of implicit doubling is therefore 8DH + 4I + 14M.
Adding two distinct points on an elliptic curve Let P = (X 1 :
Explicit addition costs 16M, and implicit addition is done as follows
The cost of implicit addition is therefore 16DH + 5I + 8M plus one explicit square root extraction (i.e. in G).
For the square root extraction, we can either use general purpose algorithms or simply raise to the power (p + 1)/2 ≡ 2 −1 (mod p) in G, which costs about 
Not available due to hardness of factoring. Not available due to hardness of factoring. sect571r1
Not available due to hardness of factoring.
